Hideki Tojo

His Impact on WW2

World War II

On December 8, 1941 (December 7 in the Americas), Tojo went on Japanese radio to announce that Japan was now at war with the United States, the British Empire, and the Netherlands and read out an imperial rescript that ended with the playing of the popular martial song Umi Yukaba (Across the Sea), which set to music a popular war poem from the classic collection Manyōshū, featuring the lyrics "Across the sea, corpses soaking in the water, Across the mountains corpses heaped up in the grass, We shall die by the side of our lord, We shall never look back". Tojo continued to hold the position of army minister during his term as prime minister from October 17, 1941, to July 22, 1944. He also served concurrently as home minister from 1941 to 1942, foreign minister in September 1942, education minister in 1943, and minister of Commerce and Industry in 1943.

As education minister, he continued militaristic and nationalist indoctrination in the national education system and reaffirmed totalitarian policies in government. As home minister, he ordered various eugenics measures, including the sterilization of the "mentally unfit."

In the early years of the war, Tojo had popular support as Japanese forces moved from one victory to another. In March 1942, in his capacity as army minister he gave permission for the Japanese Army in Taiwan to ship 50 "comfort women" from Taiwan to Borneo without identification papers (his approval was necessary as Army rules forbade people without identification traveling to the new conquests). The Japanese historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi noted that document proves that Tojo knew and approved of the "comfort women" corps. On April 18, 1942, the Americans staged the Doolittle Raid, bombing Tokyo. Some of the American planes were shot down and their pilots taken prisoner. The Army General Staff led by Field Marshal Hajime Sugiyama insisted on executing the eight American fliers but was opposed by Tojo, who feared that the Americans would retaliate against Japanese prisoners-of-war if the Doolittle fliers were executed. The dispute was resolved by the emperor, who commuted the death sentences of five fliers but allowed the other three to die for reasons that remain unclear, as the documents relating to the emperor's intervention were burned in 1945.

As the Japanese went from victory to victory, Tojo and the rest of the Japanese elite were gripped by what the Japanese called "victory disease," as the entire elite was caught up in a state of hubris, believing Japan was invincible and the war was as good as won. By May 1942, Tojo approved a set of "non-negotiable" demands to be presented once the Allies sued for peace that allowed Japan to keep everything it already conquered while assuming possession of considerably more. Under such demands, Japan would assume control of the following territories:

  • The British Crown colonies of India and Honduras as well as the British dominions of Australia, Australian New Guinea, Ceylon, New Zealand, British Columbia and the Yukon Territory
  • The American state of Washington and the American territories of Alaska and Hawaii
  • Most of Latin America including Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti and the rest of the West Indies.

Additionally, Tojo wanted all of China to be under the rule of the puppet Wang Jingwei and planned to buy Macau and East Timor from Portugal and to create new puppet kingdoms in Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaya. As the Burmese had proved to be enthusiastic collaborators in the "New Order in Asia," the new Burmese kingdom would be allowed to annex much of north-east India as a reward. The Navy, for its part, demanded that Japan take New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa.

While Tojo was prime minister, the main forum for military decision-making was the Imperial General Headquarters presided over by the Emperor. It consisted of the Army and Navy ministers; the Army and Navy chiefs of staff; and chiefs of the military affairs bureaus in both services. The Imperial GHQ was not a joint chiefs of staff as existed in the United States and United Kingdom, but rather two separate services command operating under the same roof who would meet about twice a week to attempt to agree on a common strategy. The Operations Bureaus of the Army and Navy would develop their own plans and then attempt to "sell them" to the other, which was often not possible. Tojo was one voice out of many speaking at the Imperial GHQ, and was not able to impose his will on the Navy with which he had to negotiate as if he were dealing with an ally. The American historian Stanley Falk described the Japanese system as characterized by "bitter inter-service antagonisms" as the Army and Navy worked "at cross-purposes", observing the Japanese system of command was "uncoordinated, ill-defined and inefficient."

However, after the Battle of Midway, with the tide of war turning against Japan, Tojo faced increasing opposition within the government and military. In August-September 1942, a major crisis gripped the Tojo cabinet when the Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō objected quite violently on August 29, 1942, to the Prime Minister's plan to establish a Greater East Asia Ministry to handle relations with the puppet regimes in Asia as an insult to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Gaimusho) and threatened to resign in protest. Tojo went to see the Emperor, who backed the Prime Minister's plans for the Greater East Asia Ministry, and on September 1, 1942, Tojo told the cabinet he was establishing the Greater East Asia Ministry and could not care less about how the Gaimusho felt about the issue, which led Tōgō to resign in protest.

The American historian Herbert Bix wrote that Tojo was a "dictator" only in the narrow sense that from September 1942 on, he was generally able to impose his will on the Cabinet without seeking a consensus, but at the same time noted that Tojo's authority was based upon the support of the Emperor, who held ultimate power. In November 1942, Tojo, as Army Minister, was involved in drafting the regulations for taking "comfort women" from China, Japan (which included Taiwan and Korea at this time) and Manchukuo to the "South", as the Japanese called their conquests in South-East Asia, to ensure that the "comfort women" had the proper papers before departing. Until then the War Ministry required special permission to take "comfort women" without papers, and Tojo was tired of dealing with these requests. At the same time, Tojo, as the Army Minister, became involved in a clash with the Army chief of staff over whether to continue the battle of Guadalcanal or not. Tojo sacked the Operations office and his deputy at the general staff, who were opposed to withdrawing, and ordered the abandonment of the island.

In September 1943, the Emperor and Tojo agreed that Japan would pull back to an "absolute defense line" in the south-west Pacific to stem the American advance, and considered abandoning Rabaul base, but changed their minds in face of objections from the Navy. In November 1943, the American public's reaction to the Battle of Tarawa led Tojo to view Tarawa as a sort of Japanese victory, believing that more battles like Tarawa would break American morale, and force the U.S. to sue for peace. Moreover, Tojo believed that the Americans would become bogged down in the Marshalls, giving more time to strengthen the defenses in the Marianas. In late 1943, with the support of the Emperor, Tojo made a major effort to make peace with China to free up the 2 million Japanese soldiers in China for operations elsewhere, but the unwillingness of the Japanese to give up any of their "rights and interests" in China doomed the effort. China was by far the largest theater of operations for Japan, and with the Americans steadily advancing in the Pacific, Tojo was anxious to end the quagmire of the "China affair" to redeploy Japanese forces. In an attempt to enlist support from all of Asia, especially China, Tojo opened the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943, which issued a set of Pan-Asian war aims, which made little impression on most Asians. On January 9, 1944, Japan signed a treaty with the puppet Wang regime under which Japan gave up its extraterritorial rights in China as part of a bid to win Chinese public opinion over to a pro-Japanese viewpoint, but as the treaty changed nothing in practice, the gambit failed.

At the same time as he sought a diplomatic effort to end the war with China, Tojo also approved of the planning for Operation Ichi-Go, a huge offensive against China intended to take the American air bases in China and finally knock China out of the war once and for all. In January 1944, Tojo approved of orders issued by Imperial General Headquarters for an invasion of India, where the Burma Area Army in Burma under General Masakazu Kawabe was to seize the Manipour and Assam provinces with the aim of cutting off American aid to China (the railroad that supplied the American air bases in north-east India that allowed for supplies to be flown over "the Hump" of the Himalayas to China passed through these provinces). Cutting off American aid to China in turn might have had the effect of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to sue for peace. Following the 15th Army into India in the U-Go offensive were the Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, as the political purpose of the operation was to provoke a general uprising against British rule in India that might allow the Japanese to take all of India. The roads necessary to properly supply the 150,000 Japanese soldiers committed to invading India would turn into mud when the monsoons arrived, giving the Japanese a very short period of time to break through. The Japanese were counting on capturing food from the British to feed their army, assuming that all of India would rise up when the Japanese arrived and thereby cause the collapse of the Raj. The Japanese brought along with them enough food to last for only 20 days; after that, they would have to capture food from the British to avoid starving. Bose had impressed Tojo at their meetings as the best man to inspire an anti-British revolution in India.

In the central Pacific, the Americans destroyed the main Japanese naval base at Truk in an air raid on February 18, 1944, forcing the Imperial Navy back to the Marianas (the oil to fuel ships and planes operating in the Marshalls, Caroline and Gilbert islands went up in smoke at Truk). This breach of the "absolute defense line", five months after its creation, led Tojo to fire Admiral Osami Nagano as the Navy Chief of Staff, for incompetence. The Americans had penetrated 2,100 km (1,300 miles) beyond the "absolute defense line" at Truk, and Tojo, senior generals and admirals all blamed each other for the situation. To strengthen his position in face of criticism of the way the war was going, on February 21, 1944, Tojo assumed the post of Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, arguing he needed to take personal charge of the Army. When Field Marshal Sugiyama complained to the Emperor about being fired and having the Prime Minister run the General Staff, the Emperor told him he supported Tojo. Tojo's major concern as Army Chief of Staff was planning the operations in China and India, with less time given over to the coming battles in the Marianas. Tojo decided to take the strategic offensive for 1944 with his plans to win the war in 1944 being as follows:

  • Operation Ichigo would end the war with China, freeing up some 2 million Japanese soldiers.
  • Operation U-Go would take India.
  • When the Americans made the expected offensive into the Marianas, the Imperial Navy's Combined Fleet would fight a decisive battle of annihilation against the U.S. 5th Fleet, and halt the American drive in the central Pacific.
  • In the Southwest Pacific, the Japanese forces in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands would stay on the defensive and try to slow down the American, Australian, and New Zealand forces for as long as possible. Knowing of General MacArthur's personal obsession with returning to the Philippines, Tojo expected MacArthur to head for the Philippines rather than the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia), which was a relief from the Japanese viewpoint; the Dutch East Indies were rich in oil while the Philippines were not.

Tojo expected that a major American defeat in the Marianas combined with the conquest of China and India would so stun the Americans that they would sue for peace. By this point, Tojo no longer believed the war aims of 1942 could be achieved, but he believed that his plans for victory in 1944 would lead to a compromise peace that he could present as a victory to the Japanese people. By serving as Prime Minister, Army Minister and Army Chief of Staff, Tojo took on nearly all of the responsibility; if plans for victory in 1944 failed, he would have no scapegoat.

On March 12, 1944, the Japanese launched the U-Go offensive and invaded India. Tojo had some doubts about Operation U-Go, but it was ordered by the Emperor himself, and Tojo was unwilling to oppose any decision of the Emperor. Despite the Japanese Pan-Asian rhetoric and claim to be liberating India, the Indian people did not revolt and the Indian soldiers of the 14th Army stayed loyal to their British officers, and the invasion of India ended in complete disaster. The Japanese were defeated by the Anglo-Indian 14th Army at the Battles of Imphal and Kohima. On July 5, 1944, the Emperor accepted Tojo's advice to end the invasion of India as 72,000 Japanese soldiers had been killed in battle. A similar number had starved to death or died of diseases as the logistics to support an invasion of India were lacking, once the monsoons turned the roads of Burma into impassable mud. Of the 150,000 Japanese soldiers who had participated in the March invasion of India, most were dead by July 1944.

In parallel with the invasion of India, in April 1944 Tojo began Operation Ichigo, the largest Japanese offensive of the entire war, with the aim of taking southern China.

In the Battle of Saipan, about 70,000 Japanese soldiers, sailors, and civilians were killed in June-July 1944 and in the Battle of the Philippine Sea the Imperial Navy suffered a crushing defeat. The first day of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19, 1944, was dubbed by the Americans "the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot", as over the course of the dogfights in the air, the US Navy lost 30 planes while shooting down about 350 Imperial Japanese planes, in one of the Imperial Navy's most humiliating defeats. The Japanese believed that indoctrination in bushido ("the way of the warrior") would give them the edge as the Japanese longed to die for the Emperor, while the Americans were afraid to die, but superior American pilot training and airplanes meant the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed by the Americans. With Saipan in American hands, the Americans could take other islands in the Marianas to build airbases. The establishment of American bases in the Marianas meant the cities of Japan were within the range of B-29 Superfortress bombers and the British historian H. P. Willmott noted that "even the most hard-headed of the Japanese militarists could dimly perceive that Japan would be at the end of her tether in that case". As the news of the disastrous defeat suffered at Saipan reached Japan, it turned elite opinion against the Tojo government. The Emperor himself was furious about the defeat at Saipan; had called a meeting of the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals to consider whether it might be possible to recapture Saipan (it was not); and Prince Takamatsu wrote in his diary "he flares up frequently". Tojo was the Prime Minister, Minister of War and Chief of the Army General Staff, and was seen both in Japan and in the US as, in words of Willmott, "the embodiment of national determination, hardline nationalism and militarism". Prince Konoe and Admiral Okada had been plotting to bring down the Tojo government since the spring of 1943, and their principal problem had been the support of the Emperor, who did not wish to lose his favorite Prime Minister.

After the Battle of Saipan, it was clear to at least some of the Japanese elite that the war was lost, and Japan needed to make peace before the kokutai and perhaps even the Chrysanthemum Throne itself was destroyed. Tojo had been so demonized in the United States during the war that, for the American people, Tojo was the face of Japanese militarism, and it was inconceivable that the United States would make peace with a government headed by Tojo. Willmott noted that an additional problem for the "peace faction" was that: "Tojo was an embodiment of 'mainstream opinion' within the nation, the armed services and particularly the Army. Tojo had powerful support, and by Japanese standards, he was not extreme." Tojo was more of a follower than a leader, and he represented mainstream opinion in the Army, and so his removal from office would not mean the end of the political ambitions of an Army still fanatically committed to victory or death. The jushin (elder statesmen) had advised the Emperor that Tojo needed to go after Saipan and further advised the Emperor against partial changes in the cabinet, demanding that the entire Tojo cabinet resign. Tojo, aware of the intrigues to bring him down, had sought the public approval of the Emperor, which was denied; the Emperor sent him a message to the effect that the man responsible for the disaster of Saipan was not worthy of his approval. Tojo suggested reorganizing his cabinet to regain Imperial approval, but was rebuffed again; the Emperor said the entire cabinet had to go. Once it was clear that Tojo no longer had the support of the Chrysanthemum Throne, Tojo's enemies had little trouble bringing down his government. The politically powerful Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kōichi Kido spread the word that the Emperor no longer supported Tojo. After the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944.

As Tojo's replacement, the jushin advised the Emperor to appoint a former Prime Minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, as he was popular among the Navy, the diplomatic corps, the bureaucracy and the "peace faction". However Yonai refused to serve, knowing full well that a Prime Minister who attempted to make peace with the Americans might be assassinated, as many Army officers were still committed to victory or death and regarded any talk of peace as treason. He stated only another general could serve as Prime Minister, and recommended General Kuniaki Koiso in his place. At a conference with the Emperor, Koiso and Yonai were told by the Emperor to co-operate in forming a new government, but left in the dark about who was to become Prime Minister. As the Emperor was worshiped as a living god, neither Yonai and Koiso could ask him who was to be the Prime Minister, as one does not ask questions of a god, and after the meeting, both men were very confused as to which of the two was now the Prime Minister. Finally, Lord Privy Seal Kido resolved the muddle by saying Koiso was the Prime Minister. Two days after Tojo resigned, the Emperor gave him an imperial rescript offering him unusually lavish praise for his "meritorious services and hard work" and declaring "Hereafter we expect you to live up to our trust and make even greater contributions to military affairs".